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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020114-CA
vs.
TIMOTHY SCOTT BIRD,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/ Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to either take from Bird

on the record an admission to the alleged probation violation or make adequate findings
on the record that Bird willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation
based on the evidence proffered at the order to show cause hearing before revoking
Bird's probation as required by case law and Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12). This
Court reviews claims of plain error for obvious and prejudicial error. State v. Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989).
2.

Whether Bird was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the order to show

cause hearing when his probation was revoked. A claim of ineffectiveness presents a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P,2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject
to de novo review of the ultimate legal question of whether the defendant has received
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry,
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995).
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel1 s error."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781
P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Timothy Scott Bird appeals from the order of the Third District Court revoking

his probation and sentencing him to a term of 0-10 years in the Utah State Prison.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Timothy Scott Bird was charged by information filed in Third District Court on

or about October 3, 2000, with: rape of a child, a first degree felony; sodomy upon a
child, a first degree felony; and aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree
felony (R. 2-3).
2

On December 21, 2000, Bird waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 37).
On or about January 5, 2001, Bird plead guilty to three counts of attempted sexual
abuse of a child, third degree felonies (R. 40, 48).
On April 20, 2001, Bird was sentenced by Judge Randall Skanchy to 0-5 years
in the Utah State Prison on count I, 0-5 years on count n, and 0-5 years on count III.
Counts I and II were to be consecutive sentences and count III was to be concurrent (R.
60-61). The prison terms were suspended and Bird was placed on 36-months probation
(R. 60-61, 112).
At a review hearing held on August 24, 2001, before Judge Bruce Lubeck, Bird
was ordered to complete the sex-specific treatment program at the Northern Utah
Correctional Center half-way house (R. 68-70, 113).
On or about December 18, 2001, AP&P filed an Order to Show Cause alleging
that Bird had violated his probation by not entering into the Northern Utah Correctional
Center (NUCCC) sex-offender program (R. 74, 77-78). At the time the Order to
Show Cause was filed, Bird was incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail and had been
housed there since October of 2000 (R. 75). AP&P recommended that Bird's probation
be revoked and that he be placed in the Utah State Prison for sex offender
programming (R. 75, 77-78).
On January 11, 2002, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held before Judge
Michael K. Burton (R. 83-84). At the hearing, the trial court revoked Bird's probation
and ordered that the original sentence be imposed with counts I and II to be served
consecutively and count III concurrently (R. 83-84). The trial court also recommended
that Bird be given credit for eighteen months time served; and recommended that Bird
be considered for a sex offenders program "as soon as possible" (R. 84, 86-87).
3

On February 11, 2002, Bird filed a Notice of Appeal in Third District Court in
relation to the trial court's revocation of his probation (R. 88).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On September 20, 1999, Bird was placed on 36 months probation by Third
District Court Judge William B. Bohling in Case No. 981902501 for committing the
following offenses: sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony; sexual abuse of a
child, a third degree felony; and lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor
(Pre-Sentence Report at 10). One of the conditions of Bird's probation was that he
successfully complete the Fremont Community Corrections Center inpatient sex
offender treatment program (Id.).
Bird entered the Fremont program on January 24, 2000 (Pre-Sentence Report at
10). During a therapeutic polygraph on September 25, 2000, Bird admitted to other
victims--including the victim in this case-which had not been previously revealed (Id.).
In addition, in August of 2000, the South Salt Lake Police Department was contacted
by a sheriffs office in California concerning a wport that the victim in this case had
been sexually abused by Bird on two occasions (Pre-Sentence Report at 2).
On October 5, 2000, Bird was arrested on the current offenses. He was
removed from the Fremont program and placed in the Salt Lake County Jail (Presentence report at 8, 11). On or about January 5, 2001, Bird plead guilty to three
counts of attempted sexual abuse of a child, third degree felonies (R. 40, 48).
On April 20, 2001, Bird was sentenced by Judge Randall Skanchy to 0-5 years
in the Utah State Prison on count I, 0-5 years on count II, and 0-5 years on count III.
4

Count 11 J nil 11 were to be consecutive sentences and count III was to be concurrent (R.
60-61). The prison terms were suspended and Bird was placed on 36-months probation
with the following terms and conditions: One, serve 365 days in jail with no credit for
time served. Two, be screened for Fremont or Northern Utah Correctional or any
other program recommended by APPD. Three, complete any recommended program
and treatment. Four, pay victim restitution. Five, undergo testing for HTV and STD.
Six, write a letter of apology to the victim and send it to the court for approval (R. 6061, 112).
At a review held on August 24, 2001, before Judge Bruce Lubeck, Bird was
ordered to complete the sex-specific treatment program at the Not them Utah
Correctional Center half-way house (R. 68-70, 113).
On or about December 18, 2001, AP&P filed an Oidu to Show Cause alleging
that Bird had violated his probation by not entering into the Northern Utah Correctional
Center (NUCCC) sex-offender program (R. 74, 77-78). The progress/violation report
indicated:
This case has been staffed by the NUCCC. They will not accept Mr. Bird
because his primary residence is in Salt Lake City and he failed the Fremont
Program The Bonneville CCC staffed this case and they do not accept
probationers into their sex offender program. This case was resubmitted to the
Fremont CCC program for reconsideration. Since he previously failed their
program and was deceptive to facility staff and treatment providers, they do not
believe Mi Bird is appropriate for their program. Therefore, there is not an
impatient treatment or community correctional center program available to Mr.
Bird at this time

(R. 75). AP&P recommended that Bird's probation be revoked and that he be placed in
the Utah State Prison for sex offender programming (R. 75, 77-78).
On January 11, 2002, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held before Judge
Michael K. Burton (R. 83-84, 114). At the hearing Bird's counsel admitted that it was
true that Bird had failed to enter the Northern Utah Correctional Center sex offender
program because he was in custody (R. 114 at 2-3). At the hearing, it was proffered
that at the time Bird initially started treatment at Fremont he was advised by the
attorney who represented him at the time not to answer questions as to other victims
and offenses which was the reason for the initial failure to disclose which was largely
responsible for his termination from the program (R. 114 at 5). It was also proffered
that Fremont would not accept Bird back in to their program and that Northern Utah
would not accept Bird into their program because they were no longer accepting Salt
Lake county residents (R. 114 at 6).
At the close of the hearing, the trial court revoked Bird's probation and ordered
that the original sentence be imposed with counts I and II to be served consecutively
and count HI concurrently (R. 83-84, 114 at 10).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error in revoking his probation
without doing the following: One, take from Bird on the record an admission to the
alleged probation violation. In fact, Bird asserts that the trial court's finding in the
minute entry to the revocation hearing that he admitted the allegation is clearly
erroneous. Two, make adequate findings based on the evidence proffered at the
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hearing that Bird either willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation or
that the alleged violation presently threatened the safety of society.
Bird also asserts for the same reasons that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel at the revocation hearing as counsel failed to assert his right to due process,
the requirement that any violation be found by the trial court to be either willful or pose
a present threat to the safety of society, and that the trial court was obligated by statute
and case law to make adequate findings as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for
the revocation.
Finally, Bird asserts that he was prejudicied by the obvious errors of the trial
court and the deficient performance of counsel as his probation was revoked and he was
sentenced to 0-10 years in the Utah State Prison without due process.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN REVOKING
BIRD'S PROBATION WITHOUT FIRST EITHER TAKING AN
ADMISSION FROM BIRD THAT HE HAD VIOLATED
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION OR MAKING
ADEQUATE FINDINGS BASED ON THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE
THAT BIRD WILLFULLY VIOLATED HIS PROBATION AS
REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 77-18-1(12)
"It is well settled that a probationer shall be accorded due process at revocation
proceedings because revoking probation seriously deprives a person of his or her
liberty." State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Smith v.
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990)). See also, State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah
App. 1990).
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In Utah probation revocation proceedings must be conducted pursuant to the
procedural requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12). State v. Cannoles,
2000 UT App 363. This Court has held that "the plain meaning of section 77-18-1 leads
to the conclusion that probationers may elect either to have a hearing complete with all
the statutory protections set forth in subsections (b) through (e) or may waive the right to
a hearing thereby foregoing the procedural safeguards guaranteed in the statute." State v.
Martin, 1999 UT App 62, f9, 976 P.2d 1224. Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated §§ 7718-l(12)(d)(i) and (ii) specifies that at the order to show cause hearing "the defendant
shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit" and that if the defendant denies the
allegations then evidence shall be presented. In addition, the trial court has an obligation
to ensure that adequate findings exist in the trial court record which demonstrate and
reveal "the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation." State v. Hodges,
798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990). See also, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). This obligation is also statutorily placed on the trial
court at Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-l(12)(e)(i): "After the hearing the court shall
make findings of fact."
Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to either take from
him on the record an admission to the alleged probation violation or make adequate
findings based on the evidence proffered at the hearing that Bird wilfully violated the
terms and conditions of his probation.

A.

Bird did not admit to the probation violation on the record.
The minute entry to the order to show cause hearing held on January 11, 2002,

indicates that Bird admitted to the allegation **as stated in the Affidavit and Order to
8

Show Cause" (R. 83). However, the transcript of the hearing which is included in the
Addenda does not support such a conclusion and that such a finding is clearly erroneous
(R. 114). No where in the transcript does Bird personally admit to the allegation. No
where in the transcript was Bird asked to personally admit or deny the allegation as
required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(d)(i). The only colloquy which took
place at the hearing concerning the allegation was between the trial court and Bird's trial
counsel, Heidi Buchi:
The Court:

It says here he failed to answer.

Ms. Buchi:

—that's true, because he's been in custody.

The Court:

So, that's harder to do then

(R. 114 at 2-3). Bird asserts that this dialogue between the trial court and trial counsel is
insufficient to establish a conclusion that he admitted to the allegation as required by
statute. Cf State v. Cannoles, 2000 UT App 363 (defendant waived right to hearing
stating through counsel that he wanted "to resolve it today" and admitted the allegations
that he had violated probation) with State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990) (no
admission to allegations and hearing held with disputed facts placed in evidence).
Moreover, Bird asserts that the requirement that "the defendant shall admit or
deny the allegations in the affidavit" presents a situation that is identical in scope and
magnitude to the taking of pleas in all criminal cases which is governed by Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11(b) states: "A defendant may plead not guilty,
guilty.... If a defendant refuses to plead..., the court shall enter a plea of not guilty." Bird
asserts that without an affirmative admission by him to the allegation in the affidavit the
trial court could not properly conclude that he admitted to the allegation.
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Accordingly, Bird asserts that the trial court erroneously found in the minute entry
that he admitted to the allegation. Furthermore, given that the plain language of Utah
Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(d)(i) clearly establishes that the "defendant shall admit or
deny the allegations of the affidavit", Bird asserts that this error was also obvious
particularly in light of the responsibility placed on the trial court to ensure that the
procedural requirements of the statute and due process are satisfied. See State v. Labrum,
925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996) (holding failure to make written findings was plain error
because gang enhancement statute specifically required them). Bird likewise asserts that
he was harmed by the trial court's error because his probation was revoked based on an
erroneous assumption that he admitted to willfully violating the terms and conditions of
his probation.

B.

The trial court failed to make adequate findings that Bird willfully violated
the terms and conditions of his probation prior to revocation.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(e)(i) states that after the order to show cause

hearing "the court shall make findings of fact." In addition, due process requires that the
trial court clearly reveal in the record "the evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking probation." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990). See also,
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).
Bird has established that the trial court's finding that he admitted to the allegation is
clearly erroneous. Therefore, the trial court was required to make findings from the
evidence proffered at the hearing that Bird willfully violated the terms and conditions of
his probation prior to revoking the probation.
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"This Court has previously held that i n order for a trial court to revoke probation
based on a probationviolation, the court must determine by a preponderance of the
evidence that the violation was willful.'" State v Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, ^[24, 997
P.2d 314, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) (quoting State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d
989, 991 (Utah App. 1994)). See also, Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276. In this context, a
"finding of willfulness 'merely requires a finding that the probationer did not make bona
fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation.'" Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991 (quoting
State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah App. 1991)).
Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to make factual
findings and failing to clearly reveal in the record 'the evidence relied on and the reasons
for revoking probation." Moreover, Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error
in not specifically finding that he willfully violated the terms and conditions of his
probation and that he did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his
probation.
In fact, Bird asserts that the trial court wholly failed to make any findings as to the
willflillness of the alleged violation. Furthermore, as in State v. Hodges, the transcript
"fails to adequately show the court's reasons for revoking appellant's probation.
Specifically, the transcript does not reveal whether appellant was found in willful
violation of the conditions of his probation, or whether he was simply found, through no
fault of his own, to be unable to make adequate progress" or be accepted into an inpatient
sex offender program. 798 P.2d at 274. In fact, the evidence as preferred indicates that
Bird was unable to make adequate progress during his prior treatment at Fremont
because he was told by previous counsel not to disclose other victims so that when he
finally did disclose-which lead to a conviction dfr these charges-he was unable to be
li

accepted back into Fremont (R. 114 at 5). Similarly, Bird was unable to gain admission
to the program at Northern Utah because they were no longer accepting Salt Lake
county residents (R. 114 at 6).
In order for the trial court to avoid making a finding that Bird willfully violated
his probation, the court would have had to find that the violation "must presently threaten
the safety of society." Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277. However, the trial court also failed to
make any finding that Bird's inability to be accepted into a program "presently threatens
the safety of society." The trial court simply did not consider this issue as was necessary
when he failed to find a willful violation. Instead the trial court seemed to base his
decision to revoke Bird's probation and send him to prison on the facts underlying the
charges and the notion that the punishment fit the crime:
The Court:

—and I have to be candid with you, this kind of offense, in
any community, I think it can't be tolerated....
So, I have really no compunction sending you to prison. I
appreciate you're as worthy an individual as anybody to be watched
over, cared for, nurtured, right? But there are six people at least
who we know who have been harmed and it doesn't seem to me that
this prison term is disproportionate to the crime you've committed.
So, we've got those two competing interests, your own
benefit plus some kind of punishment for the harm that we can't in
any way condone in this society, so I think that's where I come out,
that's why I comfortable sending you to prison

(R. 114 at 14).
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Bird asserts that the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings that he
wilfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation or that the violation "presently
threatened the safety of society." Moreover, Bird asserts that this error was obvious.
The plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(e)(i) clearly requires that the
trial court make factual findings after the order to show cause hearing. Furthermore, the
due process requirements established in Gagnon and Hodges have been precedent for
more than ten years. This Court in Hodges, in addition to the Utah Code, squarely places
the responsibility of ensuring that the record contains adequate findings on the shoulders
of the trial court. Finally, Bird asserts that the trial court's failure to make such findings
was harmful as his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison without the
requirements of due process being satisfied. In addition, in general the "[fjailure of the
trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in
the record are 'clear, uncontro verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor
of the judgment.'" Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella
v. Bough, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1980)).

POINT II
BIRD WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AT THE PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (12)(c)(iii) statutorily creates a right to counsel at
probation revocation proceedings. Accordingly, Bird asserts that the constitutional
right to effective counsel also exists and that he was denied the assistance of such
counsel at the revocation hearing. In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the
Defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in
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some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have
been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App.
1989).
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Bird must show that trial
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App.
1993). To meet this prong, defendants "must prove that specific, identified acts or
omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Bird asserts that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient based upon
the following arguments which parallel the trial court's errors argued in Point I:
One, trial counsel failed to assert that Bird is entitled to procedural due process
at revocation proceedings. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; Hodges, 798 P.2d at 273;
Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1067.
Two, trial counsel similarly failed to argue that under State v. Hodges the trial
court before revoking his probation must either find that Bird willfully violated the
terms and conditions of his probation or that the .violation "must presently threaten the
safety of society." 798 P.2d at 276, 277. Furthermore, trial counsel failed to argue that
in the context of a revocation hearing willfullness means that "the probationer did not
make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." Peterson, 869 P.2d at
991. In addition, trial counsel failed to point out the similarities of this case and
Hodges and the issue of whether there was a willful violation of the terms and
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conditions of probation Or whether through no fault of his own, Bird had not been
accepted into an inpatient program.
Three, trial counsel failed to assert that the trial court was required by both the
plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-l(12)(e)(i) and Hodges I Gagnon to
make adequate findings on the record as to the "evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking probation." Hodges, 798 P.2d at 274; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786. As argued
in Point I, the trial court failed to adequately make such findings.
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. A reasonable probability has been
described as that "sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Bird asserts
that for the same reasons he was prejudiced by the trial court's obvious errors, he was
prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance-namely that his probation was
revoked and he was sentenced to 0-10 years in the Utah State Prison without adequate
attention paid to due process safeguards and without adequate factual findings made to
establish that he either willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation or
that the alleged probation violation "presently threatened the safety of society"
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Bird asks that this Court find that the obvious and
harmful errors of the trial court, and the deficient and prejudicial performance of
counsel, at the revocation hearing require the reversal of the Third District Court's
order revoking his probation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 2002.

/^^U^i/^
Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

jr

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 16th day of
October, 2002
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UTAH COBITQF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(b) The presentence investigation report shall inc&tfeiT
victim impact statement according" to guidelines set in
Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on
the victim and the victim's family/ "
*
Vw*
(c) The presentence investigation report shaD include a
specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by
a recommendation from the department regarding the
payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in
accordance withr Title 77, Chapter^ 38a, Crime ^pctxms
RestitutionActT
"* ^
*~\&j&*>
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation, report ordered
by the court under Section 76-3-4Q4, are protected and are
not available except by court order for purposes of sen- <
tencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for
use by the department.
,- < *^,/^**~*
fen riant.
(i) on probation under the supervision of the De(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney; or the
partment of Corrections except in cases of class C
defendant if not represented by counsel* the prosecutor,'
* misdemeanors or infractions;
and the court for review, three working days prior t o
J (ii) on probation with an agency of local governv
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
ment or with a private organization; or
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the '
** -" (iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of
parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be
the sentencing court.
brought to the attention of the sentencing judge,'and the
b> (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
, supervision of the department is with the departthe alleged inaccuracies of the report with theJ depart^ment
7
f
ment.
If after ten working days the ^accuracies cannot be
«* (ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the
resolved, the court shall make a determination of reljurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as orc
evance and accuracy on the record.
dered by the court.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the
'— (hi) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all
presentence investigation report at the time of sentenc^probationers.
ing, that matter shall be considered to^be waived. Cf ^
iJ^The department shall establish supervision and
(7) At the time of sentence, the courts shall receive, any
sentence investigation standards for all individuals
erred to the department. These standards shall be testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the approled on:
priate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall
?T (I) the type of offense;
be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the
J (ii) the demand for services;
defendant.
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(8> While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the
(iv) the public safety; and
-*
(v) other criteria estabhshed by the department to court may require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following
determine what level of services shall be provided,
(i> pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at
b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards
the time of being placed on probation; *c *\_- c
dl be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board
(ii) pay ^mounts required under Title 77, Chapter
fardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and
32a, Defense Costs;
*
ament prior to adoption by the department.
(iii) provide for the support of others, for whose
B> The Judicial Council and the department shall
support he is legally liable; '
*'
ahlish procedures to implement the supervision and
(iv)
participate
in
available
treatment
programs;
estigation standards.
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in
a) The Judicial Council and the department shall
a county jail designated by the- department/ after
luafly consider modifications to the standards based
considering any recommendation by the court as to
*a criteria m Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as
which jail the court finds most appropriate;* ~A
y consider appropriate.
(vi) serve a term of home confiiemenVwtacI* niay
&) The Judicial Council and the department shall
mclude the use of electronic monitoring;
"* ~ uially prepare an impact report and submit it to the
(vii) participate in compensatory service irestitu>ropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee,
tion programs, including the compensatory service
otwithstanding other provisions of law, the departprogram provided m Section 78-11-20.7;
y not required to supervise the probation of persons
(vni) pay for the costs of investigation, probation,
** of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to
and treatment services;
• **
presentence investigation reports on class C misde(IX) make restitution or reparation to the victim or
s or infractions. However, the department may supervictims with interest in accordance with Title 77,
- probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
Partment standards.
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the
l
) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court
court considers appropriate; and
*7
% with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997:
.
e for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a
^ e for the purpose of obtaining a presentence inveshigh school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or
*won report from the department or information from
a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma,
er sources about the defendant.
t~r Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abey4& ance — Probation — Supervision — Presen? tence investigation — Standards — Con&denz tiality — Terms and conditions —
|r Termination, revocation, modification, or ex^ tension — Hearings — Electronic monitoring,
jn a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant
auction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court
|d the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77* Chapter
08 in Abeyance,, and under the terms of the plea in
fee agreement.
!> On a plea of guilty* guilty and mentally ill, no
tf^st, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court
rr suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
ice the defendant on probation. The court may place the
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GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to
being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8XbXi)
because of!
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account
receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and
any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period
in. accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court
orders supervised probation and any extension of that
period by the department in accordance with Subsection
(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the
discretion of the court or upon completion without
violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If^ upon expiration or termination of the
probation period under Subsection (lOXaXl),
there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1,
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and
continue the defendant on bench probation for
the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of
the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the
court sha)] record in the registry of CJVD judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded
and immediately transfer responsibility to collect
the account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motio^
the court may require the defendant to show cause
why his failure to pay should not be treated a^
contempt of court,
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing
court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation win
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details On
outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of
confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a
hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing,
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upo n
the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a
violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upo n
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the
court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer c)r
upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a
hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of
probation have been violated.

(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging*
particularity facts asserted to constitute violati<
the conditions of probation, the court that authoi
probation shall determine if the affidavit establj
probable cause to believe that revocation, modi
tion, or extension of probation is justified.
?
(ii) If the court determines there is probable ca
it shall cause to be served on the defendant a waij
for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an ordj
show cause why his probation should not be revtj
modified, or extended.
*|
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a tim?
place for the hearing and shall be served upon*
defendant at least five days prior to the hearing
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause f<
continuance.
%
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform*
defendant of a right to be represented by counsl
the hearing and to have counsel appointed for hi
he is indigent.
;|
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant
right to present evidence.
J^
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admi
deny the allegations of the affidavit.
'|
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of
affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present
dence on the allegations.
A
(iii) The persons who have given adverse infbf
tion on which the allegations are based shal
presented as witnesses subject to questioning bjj
defendant unless the court for good cause otha
orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, app
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.^
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make i
of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violate
conditions of probation, the court may orde
probation revoked, modified, continued, or thai
entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shal
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed a
be executed.
|j
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit nig
to the custody of the Division of Substance Abuse and Me
Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a concfa
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintenc
of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified tg
court that:
<J|
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can be*
from treatment at the state hospital;
Jg
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available fog
defendant; and
J|
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-6100
are receiving priority for treatment over the defend*
described in this Subsection (13).
^f
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including pre
tence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in a|
dance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records A3
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-40$
63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not ordet|
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this sect
the department may disclose the presentence m v e s ^ 8 |
only when:
"•"»
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection J
202(7);
M
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency o r ^
agency approved by the department for purposes o|
pervasion, confinement, and treatment of the offenag
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

Are you wanting anybody, Ms. Buchi,

5

MS, BUCHI:

I am.

6

Timothy Bird matter.

4

or—

7

THE BAILIFF:

8

THE COURT:

9

I would like to call the

Timothy Bird.
I looked in the file and got the

sense that this was an order to show cause hearing, but I

10

can't see the allegation.

We've got the—the order to

11

show cause, but I don't have what he's supposed to have

12 I done or not done.
13

MS. BUCHI:

Well, the allegation, your Honor,

14

is that he failed to complete the Northern Utah

15

Correctional Facility sexual offender program.

16
17

THE COURT:
copy?

Mr. Strongberg, can you get me a

He's always good.

18

MS. BUCHI:

He is.

19

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) computer somewhere—

20

No, we looked a little bit today, Marcy did,

21

and couldn't find it, so he didn't even go in; is that

22

right?

23

MS. BUCHI:

Well—

24

THE COURT:

It says here he failed to answer.

25

MS. BUCHI:

—that's true, because he's been in

1

custody.

2

THE COURT:

So, that's harder to do then.

3

MS. BUCHI:

It is harder to do*

4

This is the history of this case, your Honor,

5
6
7

since you are about the fifth judge—
THE COURT:

I looked a t — I was able to read the

sentencing, the transcript of the sentencing that y o u —

8

MS. BUCHI:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

—talked with J u d g e —

10

MS. BUCHI:

Skanchy.

11

THE COURT:

—Skanchy that day.

12

MS. BUCHI:

And Mr. Cope did as well.

13

THE COURT:

Cope was here, that's righto

14
15

You,

Cope and—okay.
MS. BUCHI:

At the sentencing, Judge Skanchy

16

ordered that he be screened for acceptance at Fremont,

17

Bonneville, Northern Utah and Orange Street.

18

back three times for reviews on that.

19

in August of last year, the judge—and you know, I don't

20

remember which judge it was that day, but I don't believe

21

it was Judge Skanchy—

We came

At the last review

22

THE COURT:

By then, it might have been Lubeck.

23

MS. BUCHI:

It was Judge Lubeck.

24

Ordered that he go to Northern Utah and he

25

signed that order.

THE COURT:

Had Northern Utah accepted him by

MS. BUCHI:

Well—

THE COURT:

Because you were screening, I guess

MS. BUCHI:

— w e were screening and the other

then?

that w a s —

ones turned him down and the reason they turned him is
because he w a s —
THE COURT:

Because of Fremont?

MS. BUCHI:

— h e was at Fremont originally—

THE COURT:

And he messed up some way.

In

their view.
MS. BUCHI:

Well, part of the treatment program

at Fremont—
THE COURT:

Is—

MS. BUCHI:

—is—

THE COURT:

— t o admit your stuff.

MS. BUCHI:

— t o admit any other victims and

also to take—
THE COURT:

And he (inaudible)

MS. BUCHI:

— o f that—

THE COURT:

I guess they somehow interpreted

that to be a violation, huh?
MS. BUCHI:

He—and I didn't represent him at

that time, your Honor, he did have private counsel at

4

1

that time*

2

Mr. Bird and with his mother, that at the time that he

3

was initially starting the treatment at Fremont, he was

4

advised by his attorney not to answer those questions

5

initially.

6
7

I believe through ray conversations with both

Then he did answer them a n d —
THE COURT:

So, they found him to be non-

compliant or some such?

8

MS. BUCHI:

That is correct.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MS. BUCHI:

And that—and that is unfortunate

11
12
13

for Mr. Bird.
THE COURT:

Because Fremont would be the one

that would normally take him?

14

MS. BUCHI:

That is correct.

15

They have indicated, and I've spoken with them

16

as well, as has Mr. Hibler and, you know, a lot of

17

people, a lot of us have spoken to Fremont.

18

belief that at this point, they're still not willing to

19

take him back because of that initial non-compliance and

20

I can certainly understand the position on that*

It's my

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MS. BUCHI:

It's also, I think unfortunate for

23

Mr. Bird that he was following the counsel—the attorney

24

that he had the t i m e —

25

THE COURT:

I guess the reality is, though,

we're stuck with that—MS- BUCHI:

The reality is we are stuck with

that, but he has been in custody since October 5th of
2000.

And these—these charges, although they were

brought as new charges were as a result of his disclosure
at Fremont.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. BUCHI:

Mr. Bird—I mean, I guess it's not

the direct fault of Mr. Bird that Northern Utah wouldn't
take him.

Certainly through the process of when he was

at Fremont and—and also, I believe, Northern Utah isn't
taking anybody from Salt Lake County anymore, that's—
THE COURT:

What seems to me what's here—

MS. BUCHI:

— a s well—

THE COURT:

I don't know who's written this,

that's Mr. Hibler, I guess, huh?
MS. BUCHI:

Yes.

Mr. Hibler.

THE COURT:

Seems to say that—yeah, 'cause he

lives in Salt Lake County and he failed Fremont, so I
guess those two reasons.
MS. BUCHI:

That's correct.

And I guess, your Honor, you know, Mr. Bird
has, at least since the time that I have represented him
and—and I believe that's the offer that he was given by
Mr. Cope is a reflection of his willingness to admit and

6

1

to admit that he needed treatment and I think that's

2

covered pretty well in the sentencing colloquy that both

3

Mr. Cope and I had*

4

THE COURT:

True.

5

MS. BUCHI:

Mr. Bird wants treatment, has

6

always wanted treatment, at least from my beginning to

7

represent him in October of 2000.

8

unfortunate we're at this point right now where he's

9

still wanting treatment and is unable to begin to do

And so I — I think it's

10

that, because he certainly does and he's been 15 months

11

now without treatment that he knows that he needs.

12

He also understands that the victims need

13

treatment or need reparation for that, which he is

14

willing to provide and that's—that's, at least in my

15

conversations with Ms. Andruzzi, that's certainly a

16

result of this conviction, of these convictions, are that

17

the victims in this can get restitution for their

18

treatment and that they can initiate that process.

19

i s — h e agrees with all of that.

He

20

I just—I would hate to see him go to prison

21

when he's been up front and—at least in the time that

22

I've been representing him, that h e ' s —

23

THE COURT:

The conundrum is that nobody can

24

treat him but the prison; right?

25

him.

Or nobody will accept

MS. BUCHI:

As an in-patient, nobody will,

THE COURT:

Well, I guess our other problem is

the number of victims here almost scream at you, we can't
let him out until at least we've given him a shot, that's
my—kind of how I read Judge Skanchy and at least the
report Hibler's got here, that it's an in-patient kind of
thing or it's not.
So, your concern is, you think that the
prison's a little too much for what—
MS* BUCHI:

My concern is the same—

THE COURT:

—he's done?

MS. BUCHI:

—and—and when I talked to Mr.

Hibler, he indicated this was not true.

My understanding

previously and I think it was also Mr. Cope's is that if
he did go to prison, he would not begin receiving the
treatment until within two to three years of his release.
THE COURT:

What—

MS. BUCHI:

But when I talked to Mr. Hibler, he

said that he would probably go in close to immediately
and I'm not really familiar with that.

I—he told me

that it wasn't—that wasn't the case any more, that he
would go in quickly.
THE COURT:

Mr. Strongberg, do you have a view,

based on some, knowledge?
MR. STRONGBERG:

Maybe you do.
I would—I would go with what

8

1

young girl, I guess she's in California now?

2

MS- BUCHI:

Yes.

3

THE COURT:

Christine would be the name?

I

4

mean, she's only one of six and just to read the negative

5

impact it's had there, it's really hard, Mr. Bird, to

6

say, well, you know, we'll just let you out after a year-

7

and-a-half.

8

spread, it probably can't be measured, really*

9

I mean, the harm you've caused is so wide-

So, I guess what you want me i s — t o do is to

10

decide something, so I think what I need to do now is

11

commit you to a prison.

12

I read this right, one of them is consecutive to one of

13

them and the third one's concurrent, so I guess you've

14

got a zero to ten, essentially is what you are.

You've got the zero to five.

If

15

MS. BUCHI:

And your Honor, I would a s k —

16

THE COURT:

I--I think I c a n —

17

MS. BUCHI:

— a m e n d it as to (inaudible)

18

THE COURT:

Can I give you credit for the year-

19

and-a-half?

20

MS. BUCHI:

21

him credit for the time served.

22
23
24
25

You can request that the Board give

THE COURT:

I'll do that, request a year-and-a-

MS. BUCHI:

I would request, since that

half.

sentence was given with a—with an understanding that he

10

1

Mr, Hibler's indicated, that's—he's from our sex

2

offender unit and I would imagine he has a clear

3

understanding—

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. STRONGBERG:

6

THE COURT:

7

Well, does Hibler—

«—of course, he works with this

kind of inmate.

8

MR. STRONGBERG:

9

MS. BUCHI:

10

— o f that program.

Exactly.

He does.

MR. STRONGBERG:

And the fact that he's : be^ U<

11

jail since October of 2000, I would imagine would bump

12

up, if the Board of Pardons is willing to give him a

13

credit for time served, that would bump up his relea v?

14

date, which could possibly bump up his admittance into

15

the sex offender treatment programs out at the prison

16

THE COURT:

Have you got any other sugges

17

Any other suggestion you might have as some kind of *r

18

patient program?

19

MS- BUCHI:

My other suggestion is intensive

20

supervision with out-patient treatment.

21

is opposed to that, as is A P 4 P»

22

THE COURT:

I know the e -

I guess emotionally, I am a 11ti

23

bit on the other side of that one, too*

24

as there are and just reading a tiny, tiny bit of the

25

report, I didn't get much of a—I don't know how this

9

As many vietiiw

1

would be on probation, whether those could be concurrent?

2

THE COURT:

All three?

3

MS. BUCHI:

Yes.

4

THE COURT:

No-

I'll let the Board of Pardons

5

can do that if they fell it appropriate, but I think when

6

you have six victims, that the zero to ten is appropriate

7

with two running consecutive and one being concurrent

8

with either one of those that are consecutive to each

9

other.

10

Anything else, Ms. Buchi, right now?

11

MS. BUCHI:

12

Can we also make a recommendation

that be—he be considered as soon as possible for the—

13

THE COURT:

If—if my recommendation™

14

MS. BUCHI:

—treatment?

15

THE COURT:

—carries any weight, I'd certainly

16

make the recommendation that as quickly as he can be put

17

into one of these programs that deal with the offenses

18

that he's pled guilty to, that he be sent to these sex

19 | offender programs.
20

Right?

MS. BUCHI:

No question there.

And—well, and your recommendation

21

actually does carry more weight than mine does; so if I

22

could—

23
24
25

THE COURT:

How about Mr. Strongberg?

you'd have the heaviest—
MS. BUCHI:

Okay.

11

Then

1

THE COURT:

— o n the order.

2

MS. BUCHI:

How is that A P & P —

3

MR. STRONGBERG:

4

Probably that Agent Hibler's

will make that—

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

MS. BUCHI:

And I'll call him as well.

7

MR. STRONGBERG:

8

He's—will be making a

recommendation to the board—

9

MS. BUCHI:

Okay.

10

MR. STRONGBERG:

11

THE COURT:

12

Anything else right now?

13

Mr. Bird, we haven't let you say much, but do

14

—regardless •

Good.

you want to say anything?
MR. BIRD:

15

Yes, I do, Judge.

I guess what's

16

frustrating me most is they always put negativity but

17

they have not put anything in the facts.

18

which w a s —

19
20

THE COURT:

Susan Nexan,

Should be like a positive thinq

you / re—

21

MR. BIRD:

Well, yes.

22

to say.

23

call me diamond in the rough—

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BIRD:

That's what I was trying

Susan Nexan was my counselor and she used to

I think I read that in here.
—because of the fact that I was

12

making great progress.

I have made a lot of headway, I

know all my cycles, I know my red flags.

If given the

chance, I could complete any program and I'll show
whoever wants to be shown that I won't do this again.

I

did this for help, I have changed—
THE COURT:

And you lost me on that because I

think you've used that phrase before.

You did this for

help and that's—
MR. BIRD:
THE COURT:

Attention getter.

This is not a —

Oh, really?

MR. BIRD: Well—THE COURT:
MR. BIRD:

No other way to get attention?
Not—that's not a point, Judge, it's

not a point that I could find in time, if you understand,
you know, I —
THE COURT:

I see.

'Cause you were in another

mind set?
MR. BIRD:

Right.

you know, but not now.

Yes.

That was back then,

And you know, that's—frustrates

me because I know I can succeed if given a chance.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And I—I hope—maybe if I

can convey this to you, I mean, besides sitting here
trying to do what's right for you, there is according to
the duty I have to the community—
MR. BIRD:

Uh huh.
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1

THE COURT:

—and I have to be candid with you,

2

this kind of offense, in any community, 1 think it can't

3

be tolerated,

4

MR, BIRD:

5

THE COURT:

Well, I understand that.
So, I have really no compunction

6

sending you to the prison.

7

an individual as anybody to be watched over, cared for,

8

nurtured; right?

9

we know who have been harmed and it doesn't seem to me

10

that this prison term is disproportionate to the crime

11

you've committed.

12 I

I appreciate you're as worthy

But there are six people at least who

So, we've got those two competing interests,

13

your own benefit plus some kind of punishment for the

14

harm that we can't in any way condone in this society, so

15

I think that's where I come out, that's why I'm

16

comfortable sending you to the prison.

17

I'm appreciative with your attitude that you're

18

going to make the best of it, but I think you have to do

19

it in the confines of the prison.

20

MR. BIRD:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MS. BUCHI:

Thank you, your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

Thank you.

25

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

23

Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.
Thanks to you both.
That's all

I have.
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